Florida’s 4th DCA Applies New Analytical Framework for Claims of Assistance of Counsel
You may recall from two of my posts a few months ago that in Lafler v. Cooper, No. 10-209, and Missouri v. Frye, No. 10-444, the United States Supreme Court revised the analytical framework to be used for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to communicate plea offers. (To see those posts, click here and here). Well, Florida’s 4th DCA has now issued an opinion, Gribble v. State, 4D11-4352, addressing both of those US Supreme Court decisions, as well as the Florida Supreme Court decision of Alcorn v. State, 38 Fla. L. Weekly S397 (Fla. June 13, 2013).
In Gribble, the defendant appealed the summary denial of his 3.850 motion, wherein he alleged that his criminal defense attorney was ineffective for misadvising him of the maximum sentence he faced. Based on counsel’s misadvice, Gribble rejected a plea offer. After trial, he was convicted of driving on a suspended license, and the State requested habitualization. The court sentenced Gribble to 8 years’ imprisonment, which is 3 years more than he was advised he could get. According to Gribble, had counsel advised him that he could get 10 years as an habitual offender on the DWLS count, he would have taken the State’s 5 year plea offer.
On appeal, although the State conceded deficient performance by counsel, the State (predictably) argued that Gribble failed to prove that he was prejudiced because he was sentenced to only 8 years, which is less than the potential 10 years he faced. However, the Court rejected the State’s argument, and noted that the correct analysis of the prejudice prong under Lafler, Frye, and Alcorn requires an examination of “whether the defendant has shown a reasonable probability that the end result of the criminal process would have been more favorable by reason of a plea to a lesser charge or a sentence of less prison time, not whether he received the same sentence as what he was incorrectly advised.” Gribble, slip op., pg. 2. The court reversed the trial court’s summary denial of Gribble’s 3.850 motion, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Alcorn, Lafler, and Frye.