2nd DCA Examines Defense of Necessity in DUI Cases, And Florida Supreme Court Reevaluates Cause Challenges

by appealattorneylaw

Well, voluntary bar commitments are heating up, which leaves less time for blogging, but I wanted to take a moment to pass along 2 cases worth noting for Florida’s criminal defense and criminal appeals attorneys.

First, DUI practitioners should read Brooks v. State, 2D11-2586, because the Court discusses the defense of necessity in DUI cases.  According to the opinion, Brooks asked the trial court to instruct the jury on the defense because the evidence at trial showed that Brooks was compelled to drive (after some party time with his friends, of course) to save his friend’s ailing cat.   Unfortunately for Mr. Brooks, the Court disagreed.  Since the defense is so unusual, the Court relied on opinions from other jurisdictions.   Brooks, slip op., pgs. 5-6.  Ultimately, the Court stated that the defense of necessity is not available as a defense to DUI in Florida where the asserted emergency involves the threat of harm to an animal instead of a person.

Next is Matarranz v. State, SC11-1617.  You know it’s going to be a long opinion when it opens with a quote from To Kill A Mockingbird, and ends with a quote from Thomas Jefferson.  The short version: the Florida Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Third District, and remanded for a new trial because the trial court erred in denying cause challenges.  In so doing, the Court clarified the law surrounding peremptory challenges and the removal of jurors for cause.  With regard to the State’s preservation argument, the Court found that the issue had been sufficiently preserved because (1) defense counsel moved to strike the juror based on a thorough conversation regarding her ability to be fair and impartial; (2) after the trial court denied the challenge for cause, counsel had to use a peremptory challenge to strike the juror; (3) counsel exhausted all his peremptory challenges; and, (4) counsel thereafter identified and listed additional jurors he would have excused if provided with an additional challenge.  See Matarranz, slip op., pgs. 13-17.

The Court next determined that the trial court reversibly erred by denying counsel’s challenge for cause.  In so doing, the Court specifically observed that it’s OK for counsel to engage potential jurors in conversations regarding their partialities, biases, prejudices, and misconceptions when they result from a lack of familiarity with the judicial system, rather than from immutable opinions and attitudes that arise from personal experiences and firmly held beliefs.  See slip op., pg. 22.  In other words, where counsel has a concern about a potential juror’s misinformation and confusion regarding the law or process, counsel may engage the potential juror in an effort to rehabilitate the potential juror.

Finally, much of the Matarranz opinion consists of the majority opinion’s criticism of Judge LaBarga’s dissent, and the dissent’s criticism of the majority.  If you happen to like to reading such verbal sparring, you’ll certainly enjoy this opinion.  See pgs. 27-33 for the majority’s criticism of Judge Canady’s dissent, and pages 36-40 for the dissent.