Tag Archives: defense

Florida Supreme Court Holds that Public Defender May Decline Future Appointments Based On Office Wide Problems Which Impact Effective Representation

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The Florida Supreme Court issued a pretty interesting opinion right before the Memorial Day weekend–Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida v. State, No. SC09-1181.  I remember reading news reports about this case back in 2008 or 2009, and it seemed like a pretty big deal that the Public Defender for Miami Dade County was actually so overloaded that the entire office was filing motions in numerous non-capital felony criminal cases seeking to decline future appointments, arguing that excessive caseloads prevented the office from providing effective representation.  Well, although the opinion left the most interesting matter unresolved (i.e., the question of whether to grant or deny the PD’s motion), the Court did nevertheless hold that the Public Defender could file such aggregate motions where there is an office-wide problem as to effective representation, and that motions to withdraw could be granted pursuant to Florida section 27.5303 so long as the PD shows that there is a substantial risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by representation to another client.  See Public Defender, slip op., pgs. 25-35.  However, because the case had been pending in the Supreme Court so long, the Court remanded the matter back to the trial court for a determination of whether the conditions underlying the PD’s motions to decline future appointments still exist.

What is the impact of this case?  Well, if the trial court determines that the conditions at the Miami Dade Public Defender’s office are unchanged, and that the Public Defender’s motions should be granted, then that means the cases will have to be handled by other court-appointed counsel.  In other words, more work (and fees) for other court-appointed criminal defense attorneys!  Now, if we could just get the Florida Legislature to repeal the fee caps imposed last year for criminal defense and criminal appeals lawyers . . .

I hope you had a great Memorial Day weekend!

After Winning a New Trial, Goodman Loses a Lawyer, and Death Row Inmate William Van Poyck Wins A Team of Lawyers

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Well, after winning a new trial (while the case is on appeal, no less) John Goodman lost a key member of his criminal defense team, Robert Black.  For the articles in the Palm Beach Post and Sun Sentinel, click here and here.  Maybe this means that Goodman and the State have reached a plea agreement?

Meanwhile, the Palm Beach Post also reports that there’s quite a bit of legal havoc in the William Van Poyck death penalty case.  Although I have not yet been able to locate the order issued by the Florida Supreme Court, the Court has apparently pulled a surprise move.  Even as Van Poyck’s June execution date approaches, the Court appears to have appointed a team of lawyers from Palm Beach County to represent Van Poyck.  For the article in the Palm Beach Post, click here.

To me, the Van Poyck case highlights just a fraction of what is wrong with Florida’s death penalty.  If the case is still important enough for the court to appoint new lawyers, even at this late stage, why should the Governor be signing the warrant for Van Poyck’s execution?  And why is it that after years of being unable to reach any sort of agreement with regard to amending the death penalty statute so as to render it constitutional, (why bother with that?), the Florida legislature is able to enact legislation that limits the appeals process, thereby actually speeding up the death penalty executions?

This is News??

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Have any of you read the latest copy of the Florida Bar news (February 15)?  The title for one of the articles on the front page reads, “Study Suggests Conflict Attorneys Are Underpaid.”  Shocking!  (You can check out my previous post showing exactly how underpaid criminal conflict attorneys are by clicking here).

Sarcasm aside, I am hopeful that this article means that there may be some movement on this issue in the Florida legislature in the future.  I know, I know, it may be too much to hope for, but you never know . . . Wouldn’t it be great for Florida’s criminal defense and criminal appeals attorneys to be able to earn a realistic fee for accepting appointments in criminal cases again?

Florida Supreme Court Affirms Conviction Despite Improper Comments from Prosecutor, and Fourth DCA Reverses One of its Own on Issue of Pre-Trial DNA Testing Procedures

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The Florida Supreme Court and Fourth DCA have both issued interesting opinions in the last week, so I though I’d pass them along.

First, in Gary Fontaine Bell v. State, SC10-916, the Court examined a series of statements made by the prosecutor.  Although the analysis of each statement is a bit tedious, the case is good to read because it illustrates an important lesson for criminal defense and criminal appeals attorneys alike: to preserve an issue for appeal, you have to object, and renew your objections at the appropriate time.  In Bell, athough the court found that several statements were improper, the Supreme Court nevertheless affirmed Bell’s conviction for lewd and lascivious molestation on a victim under 12 by a person 18 or older because Bell failed to preserve the issues for appeal, and because the comments did not constitute fundamental error.  See Bell, SC10-916, slip op., pgs. 16-18.  The statements examined by the Court include:

(1) During closing argument, with regard to the age of the victim, the prosecutor stated, “so without any evidence contradicting [the State’s evidence,] the State has proven to you beyond a reasonable doubt the first element of the charge.”  The Court found this statement did not constitute an improper comment on Bell’s right to remain silent because the statement concerned an issue that witnesses other than Bell could have refuted.  Also, the Court found no improper burden shifting.  See Bell, SC10-916, slip op., pgs. 2, 11-12.

(2) During voir dire, the prosecutor asked questions including “[n]ow, would anyone just right off the bat tell me that if all I have is a [sic] word of a child to evaluate as the evidence, that that’s not enough; I would need more?”; “[w]ithout hearing any other thing about the case, could you tell me right now that the testimony of a child alone would be insufficient for you?”; and, “if you heard the testimony of a child telling what happened and there were no other eyewitnesses, would that not be enough for you under any circumstances?”  After determining that Bell failed to preserve the issues for appellate review because he failed to renew his objection prior to the jury being sworn, the Court also found that the statements did not comment on Bell’s right to remain silent.  See Bell, SC10-916, slip op., pgs. 3-4, 19-20.

(3) During the initial portion of closing argument, the prosecutor stated “so without any evidence contradicting that the State has proven to you beyond a reasonable doubt the first element of the charge;” “in cases like this, it is always a one-person’s word against another;” “it is the word of [the victim] against the plea of not guilty that Gary Bell has entered;” “[s]o if you are looking for a reason to not believe [the victim] there isn’t one.  Because there is no evidence that she would have made this up at this particular time under these particular circumstances;” and, “[t]his is also a very important day for [the victim], her family and the people of the State of Florida who I represent.”  The Court found such statements either impermissibly commented on Bell’s right to remain silent, or otherwise implied that Bell had a burden of proof.  See Bell, SC10-916, slip op., pgs. 5, 6, 7, 13, 14.

(4) In the rebuttal portion of closing argument, the prosecutor stated, “Well, did you hear any testimony, any evidence that supports that statement?”  The Court found that such statement was proper, as it was an invited response.  See Bell, SC10-916, slip op. pgs. 8, 16.

Finally, in Esdras Cardona v. State, 4D09-3636, the Fourth District held that the trial court erred in not holding an evidentiary hearing before ordering specific procedures for DNA testing.  The most interesting thing of the opinion?  The trial judge who was reversed is Judge Gerber-who now sits on the Fourth DCA.

Happy reading!

Florida’s 4th DCA Certifies Question to Florida Supreme Court: Whether State Must Prove Actual Knowledge of Crash Under Fla. Stat. 316.027

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The week’s flown by, but I wanted to mention quickly that in Zacariah Dorsett v. State, No. 4D11-1530, Florida’s 4th District Court of Appeal has reversed a conviction for Leaving the Scene of a Crash Involving Injury, and certified a question of great public importance: “In a prosecution for violation of section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2006), should the standard jury instruction require actual knowledge of the crash?”

Dorsett was charged with Leaving the Scene of a Crash Involving Injury after Dorsett struck a teenager who fell from his skateboard.  Unfortunately for both Dorsett and the teen, Dorsett dragged the teen an unstated distance along the road before being stopped by police.  At trial, although several witnesses testified as to their views of the accident, Dorsett testified that he was unaware of the crash.  The trial court rejected Dorsett’s request for a special jury instruction.  On appeal, although the 4th DCA did not fault the trial court for instructing the jury according to the standard instructions, the court reversed, and requested the Florida Supreme Court to specifically “focus on the knowledge requirement as it relates to the accident itself,” in light of a prior decision, State v. Mancuso, 652 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1995).

Although Dorsett’s conviction has been reversed, the litigation may not be over just yet.  Florida’s criminal defense attorneys and criminal appeals attorneys will have to stay tuned to see if the Florida Supreme Court decides to accept jurisdiction.

The Palm Beach Post reports that the teen, now 21 years old, has survived the accident, but requires constant attention from a caregiver.

United States v. Hall, No. 11-14698: Eleventh Circuit Reverses 4-Level Enhancment For Fraudulent Use of Identifying Information to Obtain Credit Cards

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I had to do a double-take when I read the opening paragraph of United States v. Erica Hall, No. 11-14698:

Hall pled guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (Count 1); conspiracy to commit identity theft and access device fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count 2); wrongfully obtaining and transferring individually identifiable health information for personal gain, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a)(2) (Count 3).  When imposing Hall’s sentence, the district court applied a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) because it found that the offense involved more than 50 but less than 250 victims.  In objecting to the enhancement, Hall argued that the mere transfer or sale of identifying information unlawfully or without authority does not equate to the actual use of identifying information for a fraudulent purpose.  Therefore, because the conspirators actually used only identifying information for 12 out of 141 individuals to obtain fraudulent credit cards, Hall argued that the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A) was more appropriate because it applies to more than 10, but less than 50, victims.  The district court rejected Hall’s argument, but we do not.  Accordingly, we vacate Hall’s sentence and remand for resentencing.

Wow.  Those are words not often found in an Eleventh Circuit opinion.  No doubt that Hall’s appellate counsel and other criminal defense lawyers practicing in the Southern District of Florida will be pleased.

In another case, Norman Mearle Grim, Jr.  v. Fla. Sec’y, Dept. of Corrs., No. 11-11890, the Eleventh Circuit reverted to its usual self and denied a death-row inmate’s habeas petition.  In the opinion, the Court again rejected a constitutional claim based on Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  In support, the Court pointed to a recently issued decision, Evans v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corrs., 699 F.3d 1249, 1264 (11th Cir. 2012), where the Court held that Florida’s death penalty statute is constitutional.  For my previous post on the Evans case, click here.

Will Police Officers Need A Warrant To Take Nonconsensual Blood Samples in DUI Cases?

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Florida’s DUI defense attorneys should know that the United States Supreme Court heard oral argument in a DUI blood case on January 9, 2013.  In Missouri v. McNeely, SC 11-1425, the question presented is: Whether a law enforcement officer may obtain a nonconsensual and warrantless blood sample from a drunk driver under the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement based upon the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream.

Although the Palm Beach Post published a brief report on the arguments, a more thorough discussion of the oral argument can be found at SCOTUSblog.  After reading the SCOTUSblog discussion, it seems that the Justices may be leaning towards requiring a warrant before a blood draw can be taken, except in exigent circumstances.  Here’s a few paragraphs from SCOTUSblog:

Endlessly repeating the claim that there would never be enough time to get a warrant before alcohol content would dissipate, as the lawyers for the state and for the federal government did, seemed to impress not one member of the Court.  Even a Justice broadly sympathetic to law enforcement, like Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., used his questions to explore when officers in rural communities would be given a pass on a warrant requirement, without suspending that requirement altogether.

A few minutes into Missouri’s argument , by John N. Koester, Jr., an assistant prosecuting attorney in Jackson, Mo., Justice Antonin Scalia set the tone that would prevail.  “Why not force the suspect to take a breathalyzer test rather than having a needle forced into his arm?”  That question immediately demolished the notion that a blood test is not an invasive procedure and, being a form of force, was something that should not be left within complete police discretion.   And, of course, the only way to keep the procedure from being simply a matter of police choice was to require them to ask someone neutral for permission — in other words, seek a warrant.

Koester [also] learned quickly that Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, always a potential “swing” voter, was deeply skeptical of the never-enough-time argument.   Kennedy noted that half of the states do not allow the taking of DUI blood samples without a warrant, and they have streamlined procedures for issuing warrants that deal with the alcohol dissipation phenomenon.   “Does that bear on the question of reasonableness?” Kennedy asked, rhetorically.

Given the tenor of the Justices’ questions at oral argument, this case has potentially huge implications for Florida’s Implied Consent law.  Florida’s DUI defense and criminal appeals attorneys should stay tuned.  To read a transcript of the oral arguments, click here.  The audio recording should be available at the end of the week, on Friday, January 11, 2013.  The general page for links to the US Supreme Court audio recordings can be found by clicking here.

Pagan v. State, No. 2D11-3804: Florida’s Second DCA Issues Opinion Touching On Issue of Plea Bargain Waivers of Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

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On November 14, 2012, the Second DCA issued an opinion in Pagan v. State, No. 2D11-3804, wherein the court held that the trial court erred in summarily denying Pagan’s Rule 3.170(l) motion to withdraw his plea based on misleading advice of counsel.  According to the opinion, after Pagan was sentenced to 30 years for his involvement in the death of a child, Pagan moved to withdraw his plea.  The trial court appointed conflict free counsel to represent Pagan, and a hearing was set.  Just before the hearing commenced, the State offered Pagan a reduced sentence of 15 years in exchange for Pagan’s waiver of any right to seek collateral relief.  The court gave Pagan time to consult with his attorney, after which Pagan accepted the State’s offer.  The court resentenced him to the lesser term, remarking to Pagan that “you would be agreeing that you will withdraw this motion to withdraw your plea and you will also be agreeing that you will not file any further post-conviction motions attempting to reduce this sentence that I am about to impose.”  Later the court added: “And just to reiterate part of the deal is you will not be filing any more post-conviction motions.  This—this is it. You filed it.  It worked for you.”  After resentencing, Pagan filed several Rule 3.850 motions, alleging that he received ineffective assistance in connection with the State’s offer to resolve his rule 3.170(l) motion.  Predictably, the trial court denied each of his motions.  On appeal, the Second District reversed.

In support of its holding, the Court first noted that a Rule 3.170(l) motion is not a postconviction matter, and that a defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in connection with such motion.  See Pagan, slip op., pg. 3.  The Court also observed that “a defendant can waive his right to collaterally attack his judgment and sentence when the waiver is expressly stated in the plea agreement and he knowingly and voluntarily agrees to the waiver.”  See Pagan, slip op., pg. 4 (citing Stahl v. State, 972 So. 2d 1013, 1015 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); Williams v. United States, 396 F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005)). However, “ineffective assistance of counsel claims attacking the advice received from counsel in entering into the plea and waiver cannot be waived.”  See Id.

While the opinion seems to have reached the right result by holding that Pagan did not waive his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, it is troubling that the court’s opinion closed with a cautionary note:

We remand to the circuit court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on
Pagan’s allegations of ineffective assistance in connection with the agreement to
resolve his rule 3.170(l) motion. We caution that Pagan may subject himself to a worse
result if he goes forward with this process, but that is his decision to make.

Pagan, slip op. pg. 4.

I also find it troubling that the Court failed to address the obvious ethical issue presented by the opinion: whether a defendant can be offered a plea bargain that requires him or her to waive future claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (or prosecutorial misconduct)?  Florida’s criminal appeals and criminal defense attorneys may remember that this past August, the Professional Ethics Committee of the Florida Bar issued Proposed Ethics Advisory Opinion 12-1, which states that plea bargains which require defendants to waive future claims of prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance of counsel violate Bar rules.

To view a few of the articles that appeared in the Florida Bar News regarding the Advisory Opinion, click here and here.  Although the Advisory Opinion has not yet been adopted by the Florida Bar Board of Governors, if there is no appeal of the proposed opinion, the Advisory Opinion will become final.

Were These Opinions Written by the Florida Supreme Court or the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit?

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Is it just me, or has anybody else out there noticed that the Florida Supreme Court’s opinions are reading more like those issued by the Eleventh Circuit?  Not only have the Florida Supreme Court opinions been getting longer and longer, but many are being issued without any dissents by the Justices who are known to most often dissent.  For example, out of the 9 opinions released in criminal appeals since September 13, 2012: (1) two opinions are more than 80 pages long; (2) two opinions are approximately 40 pages long; (3) four of the opinions are signed by all 7 Justices; and, (4) only 1 opinion had even a partial dissent, and that dissent was written by Chief Justice Polston, rather than the Court’s usual dissenters in criminal cases.  Makes you wonder . .  .

Two of the Court’s recent opinions caught my attention.  First, in Reynolds v. State, SC10-1602, the Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of a Rule 3.851 motion for postconviction relief and petition for writ of habeas corpus in a death penalty case notwithstanding the fact that one of the jurors fell asleep during the trial on several occasions.  In the court’s 82 page opinion, the Court held that the sleeping juror did not entitle Reynolds to postconviction relief because the trial court brought the matter to the parties’ attention, and defense counsel made the strategic decision to leave the sleeping juror on the panel.  I guess the lesson here is an obvious one:  if a juror falls asleep during trial, defense counsel should probably ask to have the juror removed!  The sleeping juror is discussed at pages 34-38 of the opinion.

Next, in Douglas v. Tucker, SC10-1725, the Court again affirmed the trial court’s denial of a Rule 3.851 motion for postconviction relief and petition for writ of habeas corpus in another death penalty case notwithstanding defense counsel’s failure to present mental health evidence during the penalty phase of the trial.  Although the Court found that counsel performed deficiently under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court nevertheless determined that Douglas suffered no prejudice because had counsel presented evidence of his mental health, the jury would have heard about Douglas’ antisocial tendencies.  At least Justice Lewis had the courage to express his concerns, albeit in a concurring opinion.  Justice Lewis’ concurrence can be found at pages 42-47.

Florida Criminal Defense Lawyers’ Challenges To S.B. 1960 Moving Ahead, and Brief Filed in Ulloa v. CMI, Inc., No. SC11-2291

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South Florida’s criminal defense and criminal appeals lawyers who take court-appointed criminal cases and appeals may be interested to know that the case filed by Brent DelGaizo to challenge the constitutionality of S.B. 1960 is moving forward.  On August 7, 2012, Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal, located in West Palm Beach, issued an order directing the Chief Judge for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit (Broward County) to respond to Del Gaizo’s arguments raised in his petition for writ of certiorari.  The response is due August 27, 2012.  To see the docket for DelGaizo v. Chief Judge, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, case number 4D12-2548, click here.  If the link malfunctions, just go to the 4th DCA’s search page, and enter the case number, 4D12-2548.

The Miami Chapter of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (FACDL-Miami) has likewise filed a challenge to S.B. 1960 in Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal, located in Miami.  Amazingly, an organization of Florida prosecutors has even recently voted in favor of filing an amicus brief in support of FACDL-Miami’s petition to the Third DCA.  This is great news, and only serves to reinforce that the challenges to S.B. 1960 are about more than just money.

I’ll be sure to keep you posted.  To read my previous posts on S.B. 1960, click here, here and here.

Meanwhile, in Ulloa v. CMI, Inc., No. SC11-2291, Ulloa filed his jurisdictional brief today.  To read the brief, click here.  To read my previous post on this case, click here.  Since the case is relatively new, a decision should not be expected for some time.